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Abstract 
 
Mental health and poverty are strongly interlinked. There is a gap in the literature on the 
effects of poverty alleviation programmes on mental health. We aim to fill this gap by studying 
the effect of an exogenous income shock generated by the Child Support Grant, South Africa’s 
largest Unconditional Cash Transfer (UCT) programme, on mental health. We use biennial data 
on 10,925 individuals from the National Income Dynamics Study between 2008 and 2014. We 
exploit the programme’s eligibility criteria to estimate instrumental variable Fixed Effects 
models. We find that receiving the Child Support Grant improves adult mental health by 0.822 
points (on a 0-30 scale), 4.1% of the sample mean. Our findings show that UCT programmes 
have strong mental health benefits for the poor adult population. 
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1 Introduction 
 
About 1.1bn people worldwide suffer from mental health problems. There is evidence of a 
strong relationship between poor mental health and poverty (Lund et al., 2010), which stands 
in line with the social causation hypothesis that adverse socio-economic factors precede and 
cause mental health problems (Das et al., 2007). The link between poverty and mental health 
makes mental health a global development problem (Prince et al., 2007). As unconditional 
cash transfer (UCT) programmes are used to alleviate poverty, it is natural to investigate their 
effect on mental health.  
 
One can use the Grossman model of health capital (Grossman, 1972) to hypothesise different 
possible effects of UCTs on mental health. Health has a dual nature in the model. It is a 
consumption good as it directly generates utility, but also an investment good (human capital), 
required for income generating activities. Based on the Grossman model, the effect of UCTs 
on mental health can be positive, negative, or null. The effect can be positive, as UCTs can 
increase household income and thus directly increase mental health investment opportunities 
or reduce the opportunity cost of time for mental health investment activities. Further can 
releasing the financial constraint have an immediate direct effect on the psychological 
wellbeing of household members by giving (more) financial security (Lund, 2012). However, 
an increase in income can also potentially lead to worse mental health outcomes through 
increased consumption of unhealthy goods such as alcohol and consequent worsening of and 
mental health in the long run (Gaarder et al., 2010). They can be ineffective as the monetary 
assistance provided does not enforce behavioural changes, give information or encourage 
investments in mental health. 
 
There is limited and mixed evidence on the effects of UCTs on mental health (Paxson and 
Schady, 2010; Fernald and Hidrobo, 2011; Plagerson et al., 2011; Baird et al., 2013; Eyal and 
Burns, 2015; Haushofer and Shapiro, 2016; Kilburn et al., 2016). Existing studies focus on small 
samples of females or adolescents and fail to identify the population-wide effects of UCTs on 
mental health. Further are existing studies either cross-sectional or short-term analyses and 
do not to provide information on the long-term effects of UCTs on mental health. However, 
both pieces of information are important to understand for policy makers when aiming to 
sustainably improve mental health in LMICs (Lund et al., 2011). Our research aims to fill these 
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gaps in the literature. 
 
We contribute to the literature by estimating the effects of the South African Child Support 
Grant (CSG) UCT programme on the mental health of a representative sample of the poor 
adult population from South Africa. We further extend the literature by using longitudinal data 
covering information about individuals up to six years which is unique in the existing literature. 
The CSG is South Africa’s largest social cash transfer programme and a long-term UCT 
programme. We focus on South Africa in the analysis for the high prevalence of mental health 
disorders in the country, with one in six of the population suffering from depression or anxiety 
(Plagerson et al., 2011) and unipolar depression contributing to 5.8% of the overall burden of 
disease, about 1.5 times higher than for all Low- and Middle-Income Countries (LMICs) (Jack 
et al., 2014).  
 
We use data from four waves (2008-2014) of the South African National Income Dynamics 
Study (NIDS) on 10,925 individuals living in poor households. We address selection into the 
CSG programme using eligibility as an instrument for grant receipt and account for unobserved 
individual heterogeneity in mental health by using Fixed Effects models. We find that the UCT 
programme improves adult mental health by 0.822 points (on a 0-30 scale) corresponding to 
4.1% of the sample mean. The CSG effect on mental health is heterogeneous by gender, with 
only significant effects for females. Our study is the first to provide evidence on the effect of 
UCT programmes on adult mental health in general, showing that UCT can have strong positive 
effects. 
 
2 The Child Support Grant (CSG) programme 
The Child Support Grant (CSG) was introduced by the South African Government in 1998 as 
part of the governmental social assistance programme (South African Government, 2004). The 
CSG is a UCT and the South Africa’s largest social cash transfer programme, targeting the poor 
and vulnerable population (Gomersall, 2013). The CSG aims at reducing poverty and 
vulnerability among children from poor socio-economic backgrounds by transferring monthly 
a grant to their primary caregivers, which in most cases is the biological mother of the child 
(Eyal and Burns, 2015).  
 
Eligibility for programme participation is defined by two factors: (1) the age of the child; and 
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(2) a means test of the caregiver and his/her spouse’s income and assets. The primary 
caregiver is defined as the main responsible person for the child and his/her daily needs 
(Plagerson et al., 2011). The cash transfer is substantial for poor households, as it increases 
household income by about 20-25% (Gomersall, 2013). The coverage of the CSG increased 
over time (Gomersall, 2013), as illustrated in Table 1 . Initially, only children up until the age 
of seven years were targeted, but the programme has been progressively extended over time 
to children of age up to 18 years. Before the first NIDS wave and at the time of the first NIDS 
wave children of age 0-14 were eligible to receive the grant. The income threshold was also 
lifted at a faster rate than price-inflation, from R230 (US$17.25) to R320 (US$24), leading to a 
positive real appreciation of the grant value. 
 
Table 1 here 
This makes the CSG a suitable cash transfer programme to identify the average effects of 
unconditional cash transfers on the poor adult population. The CSG represents a monetary 
shock to the average poor household in South Africa, which contains on average three to four 
children (Statistics South Africa, 2017). Additionally, evidence shows that although targeted at 
children, the transfers are shared at the household level (Delaney et al., 2008; Cluver et al., 
2013) raising the possibility of within household spill-over effects on all members. 
 
The actual receipt of the CSG ultimately depends on eligible caregiver decisions as they have 
to register. Selection into the programme is an important issue as children eligible and in need 
may miss out on the support. Recent studies show that about 27% of the eligible children have 
not received the grant (Gomersall, 2013). We discuss the selection problem in more detail in 
section 5.3.  
 
3 The National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) 
3.1 Survey structure and coverage 
We use four waves of data from the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS; 2008-2014). The 
NIDS is a biennial longitudinal survey of a nationally representative sample of the South 
African population (Southern African Development Research Unit, 2016). A two-stage cluster 
sample design was used (Leibbrandt et al., 2009). Stratification was made at the district council 
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level and clustering was implemented by primary sampling unit (geographical areas consisting 
of at least one enumeration area within the district council level). The first wave of the survey 
was conducted between January and December 2008 and consisted of 28,226 individuals 
(9,605 children and 18,621 adults) from 7,296 households. The same individuals were re-
interviewed and new household members were included in the following waves. We use the 
adult sample of the survey which includes all individuals of age 15 years and above at the time 
of the survey interview. We include in our analysis only individuals that are observed at least 
twice across waves. 
 
Across all waves we use the lower income groups of the NIDS defined by the 2008 CSG income-
eligibility lower-upper bound threshold of R800 (US$60) per capita per month in 2008. This is 
the sample for which the CSG eligibility criteria are satisfied. In doing so, we use the sample of 
poor individuals, as the lower-upper CSG bound is close to the upper-bound of national 
poverty line in 2014 of R779 (US$58) (Statistics South Africa, 2014). This sample of individuals 
satisfies the means-test used for CSG eligibility.  
 
3.2  Mental Health Measure 
We measure mental health using a validated 10-item version of the Centre for Epidemiological 
Depression Scale (CES-D) scale developed by Radloff (1977). The CES-D scale is a continuous 
variable that usually ranges from best to worst mental health. For ease of interpretation, we 
invert the scale of the CES-D ranging from zero (high depression and worst mental health 
status) to 30 (no depression and best mental health status). 
 
CES-D is a robust and clinically validated measure for depression that has been widely applied 
in the analysis of cash transfer effects on mental health (Paxson and Schady, 2010; Fernald 
and Hidrobo, 2011; Haushofer and Shapiro, 2016; Kilburn et al., 2016). It is based on measures 
self-reported by the participants and collected in every wave of the NIDS. The CES-D scale has 
been used in a wide set of longitudinal studies, and it is also a validated measure for the poorer 
populations living in LMICs (Ali et al., 2016) and in South Africa more specifically (Baron et al., 
2017). 
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3.3  Treatment (CSG) Variable  
The explanatory variable of interest is a binary variable taking value one if an individual lives 
in a household in which at least one person receives the CSG grant and zero otherwise, based 
on individuals’ reports. The average number of CSG-recipients per receiving household is 2.5, 
with 70 per cent of the CSG-receiving households having more than one CSG-recipient.  
 
3.4 Control Variables 
As mental health is influenced by life events (Allen et al., 2014), we add a binary variable 
indicating if the death of a household member had occurred in the past two years. We add a 
variable indicating the number of household members to control for social isolation, which is 
associated with poor mental health outcomes (Allen et al., 2014), and for differences in 
household size between CSG-receiving and non-receiving households (Delaney et al., 2008). 
Other variables commonly used to proxy social capital, such as social interaction or group 
membership, are not available throughout the waves. We include age to account for the 
association between age and mental health problems and age squared because of the inverted 
U-shape in the age distribution of wellbeing (Clark, 2007). Individuals aged 15-18 years old, 
are potentially eligible to receive the CSG on their own behalf. To control for any variation in 
mental health for this specific group, we add a binary variable indicating if the individual is 
aged below 19 years. We include gender, as the literature shows differences in mental health 
and in cash transfer programme effects on mental health by gender (Kilburn et al., 2016). 
We control for whether an individual is the economic decision maker responsible for 
investment and expenditure decisions of a household, as research has found a negative 
relationship between being responsible of economic decision making and perceived stress in 
low income settings (Mani et al., 2013).  
 
At a community level, poor intangible assets are found to be associated with poor mental 
health (Wright and Kloos, 2007), we control for neighbourhood effects using a categorical 
variable indicating the frequency of burglary in the neighbourhood. We include a set of binary 
variables indicating the level of common burglary and presence of theft in the neighbourhood 
of the respondent (none at all, very rare, not common, fairly common or very common) and 
use none as base category. 
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Variations across the provinces of South Africa in terms of rurality and in terms of poverty are 
large and correlated with mental health (Lund et al., 2010; Statistics South Africa, 2014). 
Moreover, take-up of the CSG varies by provinces, with Gauteng and North West showing the 
highest exclusion of children from CSG receipt (UNICEF et al., 2016). We use a set of province 
binary variables using Limpopo as base category to control for the province where an 
individual lives in (Limpopo, Western Cape, Eastern Cape, Northern Cape, for Free State, Kwa 
Zulu-West, North West, Gauteng, and Mpumalanga). We also include a set of binary variables 
to control for whether the individual lives in a formal rural setting, a tribal authority area, or 
an urban formal or informal (township) setting. Controlling for rural and informal urban areas 
is also important as CSG-receipt is lower in these areas where individuals are less likely to sign 
up due to poor representation and distance to local authorities and the increased cost of travel 
(Delaney et al., 2008). 
 
Individuals are also eligible to apply for other government grants alongside the CSG (South 
African Government, 2004). To control for any contamination effects of the other grants on 
the CSG effect on mental health, we add a set of four binary variables for whether the 
individual lives in a household that receives any of the other main support programmes (Foster 
Care Grant (FCG), the Disability Grant (DG), the Care Dependency Grant (CDG), or the Old Age 
Pension (OAP)). 
 
4 Descriptive statistics 
Tables 2a and 2b provide descriptive statistics by wave for the 10,925 individuals in the full 
sample. The average respondent is in moderate to poor mental health. Approximately 75% of 
individuals live in households receiving CSG and about 87% live in a household that is eligible 
to receive the CSG. This is consistent with previous studies (Delaney et al., 2008; Eyal and 
Woolard, 2011; Hall et al., 2012; Cluver et al., 2013; Gomersall, 2013) and is evidence of 
potential selection into the CSG, as in about 50% of the non-recipient households there is at 
least one eligible child. Every third person in the sample is male. The average respondent is 38 
years old and lives with six other individuals together in a household in a moderately safe 
neighbourhood. About 13% of individuals in the sample are younger than 19 years of age. One 
in nine households has experienced the death of a household member in the past two years. 
38% of the individuals report to have at least one individual in their household who receives 
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the old age pension, 12% the disability grant, 5% the foster care grant and 1% the care 
dependency grant. 
 
Tables 2a and 2b here 
 
Splitting the samples by waves shows the increase in the coverage of the CSG policy 
nationwide, with increasing numbers of individuals living in CSG receiving and/or in a CSG 
eligible household over time. Mental health improves slightly from an average of 19.0 points 
in 2008 to an average of 20.4 points in 2014. Table A1 discussed in section A1 of the online 
appendix compares individuals living in recipient and non-recipient households. We observe 
slightly higher CES-D scores for individuals living in receiving households, similarities in other 
grant receipt and disparities in household composition with more household members, more 
female household members and lower mean age in receiving households. 
 
CES-D is often found in the literature to have a right-skewed (or left skewed if inverted) 
distribution (Radloff, 1977) leading to non-normally distributed standard errors and  violating 
the assumptions required to implement t-tests. We assessed the skewness in the data by 
plotting the distribution of the CES-D over all waves in figure 1, showing that the CES-D is 
normally distributed and no transformation was needed. We also formally tested for normality 
and found strong support for the normal distribution of CES-D measure. 
Figure 1 CES-D distribution over all waves 
 
Source: Computation based on the sample of analysis using NIDS pooled data 
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5 Methods 
5.1 Pooled cross-sectional model estimation 
In order to investigate the association between CSG household receipt and mental health, we 
estimate the following OLS model: 
(1) 𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑿𝑖,𝑡𝛽2 + 𝑻𝒊𝛽3 + 𝑹𝒊𝛽4 +  𝑣𝑖,𝑡,           
where 𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the CES-D score of the individual i in year t. 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑖,𝑡 is a binary variable indicating 
if an individual lives in a CSG-receiving household. 𝐗 is a vector of control variables, 𝑻𝒊 is a set 
of year dummies to control for time trend effects and  𝑹𝒊 is a set of regional dummy variables 
to control for regional variations.  
 
We cluster standard errors on the primary sampling unit in all models because common cluster 
effects may occur at local level (Wittenberg, 2013). We also test for potential attrition effects 
in all models by including a dummy variable taking on a value of one if the individual left the 
survey due to death or other reasons in the following wave and zero otherwise (Verbeek and 
Nijman, 1992). We provide an analysis of sample attrition and sample transition (leaving the 
“poor” sample or moving into the “poor” sample) in section A2 of the online appendix. 
 
5.2 Fixed Effect estimation 
The OLS estimation could be downwardly biased because of potential unobserved individual 
heterogeneity in mental health, driven by unobservable behaviours and preferences (Hauck 
and Rice, 2004). We account for unobserved individual time-invariant heterogeneity in mental 
health using Fixed Effects (FE). By doing so, we focus on variation within individuals over time. 
FE address the relationship of the predictor or outcome variables with the unobserved 
individual component of the error term 𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡. 𝑎𝑖 is the unobservable time-invariant 
component and 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 is the time-varying component, uncorrelated with the covariates, of the 
individual error term. FE account for time invariant determinants such as traumatic events, 
adverse childhood events or genetic health endowments which are important in shaping 
mental health but are not observed (Golberstein and Busch, 2014). Therefore, we formally 
estimate: 
 12 
  (2) 𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑿𝑖,𝑡𝛼2 + 𝑻𝒊𝛼3 + 𝑹𝒊𝛼4 + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
 
5.3 Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation 
Selection into the CSG programme can occur for several reasons: exclusion errors occur due 
to lack of information about the programme, incomplete documents, distance to local 
authorities and related opportunity costs and travel costs, or the lack of proof of eligibility of 
the child’s age and identity (Delaney et al., 2008; Cluver et al., 2013; Gomersall, 2013). 
Furthermore, individuals with poorer mental health outcomes could be less likely to apply for 
the grant. As a consequence, omitted variable bias can affect the estimate of the effect on 
mental health. Selection bias could downwardly bias the estimated treatment effects.  
 
We address selection into the CSG programme by using an instrumental variable approach, 
which is an appropriate method to deal with selection due to unobservable factors (Angrist 
and Pischke, 2008). We instrument the binary variable of living in a CSG receiving household 
with a binary measure taking value one if at least one child eligible for the CSG grant lives in 
the household and zero otherwise. As we use a binary instrumental variable for a binary 
endogenous variable, we estimate the conditional Wald-Estimator (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). 
 
Using eligibility criteria as instrumental variable for programme participation is common in the 
literature. For example, draft-eligibility has been used as an instrument for Vietnam war 
participation (Angrist and Krueger, 1991b) or school-age-eligibility has been used as an 
instrument for years of education (Angrist and Krueger, 1991a). Furthermore, the age-
eligibility of a child has been used as instrument for CSG participation at the individual-level in 
a previous analysis (Eyal and Woolard, 2011). 
 
We considered the use of alternative instrumental variables previously used in the literature 
as proxy for local government investment and access to government services, such as: 
distance to water sources from the house or dwelling, municipal expenditures in the past 30 
days, household transport expenditures in the past 30 days, or the council level density of CSG 
receiving children, weighted by the number of council level residents. None of these 
instruments were strong in predicting receipt of CSG. 
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We use the parametric standard 2-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimator with both stages 
estimated simultaneously, first with pooled and then with FE specification and compare the 
results. FE 2SLS square estimation is feasible as both the instrumented and the instrumental 
variable vary over time. This approach has a clear strength as it allows accounting for time-
invariant and time-variant unobserved individual heterogeneity simultaneously and is the 
preferred approach in this analysis (Le and Nguyen, 2018).  
 
The first stage can be formalised as follows: 
(3) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑿𝑖,𝑡𝛾2 + 𝑻𝒊𝛾3 + 𝑹𝒊𝛾4 + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is the instrumental variable. We use linear probability models throughout the 
estimation. 
In the second stage we regress CES-D on the linear prediction of 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑖,𝑡 from the first stage 
and the full set of covariates 𝑿𝑖,𝑡.  
(4) 𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑖,𝑡̂ + 𝑿𝑖,𝑡𝑐2 + 𝑻𝒊𝑐3 + 𝑹𝒊𝑐4 + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
𝑐1is the effect of the instrumented 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝑖,𝑡 in the first stage estimation. As in equation (4.1), 
𝐗 is a vector of control variables, 𝑻𝒊 is a set of year dummies, 𝑹𝒊 is a set of regional dummy 
variables. 
 
5.4 Instrumental variable conditions 
The instrumental variable has to satisfy both the validity and the relevance conditions. Validity 
is satisfied when the exclusion restriction holds and the instrument affects the outcome 
variable only through the endogenous regressor conditional on confounders (Angrist and 
Krueger, 2001). The exclusion assumption is not testable. We provide the following four 
arguments to support it. 
 
Firstly, the instrumental variable is coded as one for all individuals, if a child who is eligible to 
receive the CSG for his/her age lives in the household. This implies that individuals living with 
children of all other not eligible ages are coded as zero. This is crucial, as age differences 
around the CSG age cut-off threshold and changes of the CSG age cut –off over time are 
orthogonal to the outcome and unlikely to affect the outcome variable directly. For example, 
the age cut-off for CSG eligibility was 13 years in 2008. The assumption here is that having a 
child aged 13 or more does not impact mental health differently to having a child of age 12 
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years or less.  
 
Secondly, we include a set of 19 binary variables indicating if children of age [0,18] live in the 
household of the respondent. These binary variables will pick up the effect of the instruments 
on mental health induced by the age of the cohabiting children. Thus, the instrumental 
variable should measure only the programme effects even when child-age mental health 
effects are present. Notably, in neither of the estimations where we control for child age 
effects, child effects are jointly significant in explaining adult mental health. 
 
Thirdly, the CSG programme has time-varying age eligibility cut-offs. Due to this variation 
families with children of the same age have different exposures to the policy at different times. 
Thus, if child-age specific effects around cut-off points are present, these effects should 
balance out over the panel data as children of all ages become available to receive the CSG 
from 2012 onwards. 
 
Fourthly, we find no statistically significant effects of child eligibility on mental health of 
individuals living in CSG financially ineligible households (income >R800). This finding strongly 
supports the assumption that changes in mental health are caused by the cash transfers and 
not by differences in child age. Also, after excluding from the analysis the care-taker receiving 
CSG, our results remain strong and significant supporting our assumption that the estimated 
instrumental variable effects do not reflect age effects. 
 
The second condition, relevance, implies that the instrumental variable is correlated with the 
endogenous regressor and has to be uncorrelated with the error term (Angrist and Krueger, 
2001). Firstly, correlation of the instrumental variable with the treatment variable at the first 
stage is satisfied in all first stage estimations. The correlation coefficient is always significant 
and shows strong magnitude in all estimations indicating that “household with a CSG eligible 
child” is a strong and relevant instrument for “household receives the CSG”. 
 
Secondly, the instrumental variable is not correlated with unobservable factors of the first 
stage estimation. Factors that determine access to the CSG could possibly also affect the 
instrumental variable in the first stage estimation. We add control variables for potential 
confounders such as the region and province where the household lives. We use FE estimation 
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which allows only for time-varying factors to affect the estimation. Thus all parameters which 
are time-invariant such as individual preferences of adults for child birth or individual 
preferences to apply for the CSG are taken out of the estimation.  
 
Thirdly, manipulation of the instrumental variable may affect the validity of the instrument 
leading to a bad instrument problem (Angrist and Krueger, 2001). In the context of the CSG, 
this would be occur if timing of birth was chosen by the poor to access CSG support.  
 
We rule out manipulation of the instrumental variable for the following four reasons: 
 
i) Fertility rates across South Africa are continuously falling since 1996, prior to the onset of 
the programme. Fertility rates fall across age-groups, provinces and population and income 
groups. The latest fertility report of South Africa based on the census 2011 clearly shows that 
fertility declined between 1996 and 2011 from 3.23 children to 2.67 children (Statistics South 
Africa, 2011). More recent statistical evidence shows a further fall in fertility rates to 2.55 in 
2015 (Statistics South Africa, 2015).  
ii) An empirical study on the effects of the CSG programme on fertility identified no difference 
in the odds for child birth between CSG receiving and non-receiving mothers which strongly 
supports the assumption of no programme induced perverse incentives of childbirth 
(Rosenberg et al., 2015). 
iii) Data on the CSG and take-up rates suggest that especially in the first years of life of the 
new-born, take-up of the CSG programme is low (Cluver et al., 2013). If individuals were to 
have children for the sole reason to receiver transfer, take-up of the programme should be 
high in the first years for the economic cost arising from childbirth, and for missing out on the 
income flow. 
iv) Estimates by the United Nations in 2005 show that the cost of raising a child from age 0-17 
are about $16,000 on average for the poor population living in LMICs (UNICEF, 2005), which is 
about R108,540 (conversion rate 1:6.7 on average in 2005). The benefit of receiving the CSG 
in 2005 was R180 a month which over 17 years equals to R36,720, assuming that individuals 
did not anticipate increases in the monthly CSG rate. Assuming that the UN estimate is valid 
for South Africa, the cost of raising a child is 2.96 times as high as the benefit. This relative 
numbers suggest that the decision to have a child solely for the purpose of receiving the CSG 
grant is unlikely considering the higher cost. 
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A last concern of the relevance of the instrumental variable considers anticipation effects of 
programme receipt. Such effects can occur due to anticipation of future changes in the age-
bandwidth for CSG eligibility or when household members are pregnant but not yet receiving 
the CSG support. To anticipate findings from the robustness analysis (placebo-estimation) with 
respect to this concern, we can exclude that such effects bias the instrumental variable. 
Following these arguments, we have strong evidence to exclude bias due to manipulation of 
our instrumental variable. This supports the relevance of the instrumental variable. 
 
A key assumption of instrumental variable estimation is that individual preferences for 
treatment are monotonic, implying that defiers are excluded (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). 
When relevance, validity and monotonicity are satisfied, we estimate the Local Average 
Treatment Effect (LATE), which is the effect for the sub-population of treatment compliers 
(Angrist and Pischke, 2008). In a special case, when always-taking behaviour can be excluded, 
the LATE simplifies to the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET) which implies that 
results can be generalised to the full study population rather than to complying individuals 
(Angrist, 2004). This special case applies to this study as the share of “Always takers” is 
negligible (see table A2 in the online appendix). 
 
5.5 Heterogeneity of the effect by gender 
We investigate heterogeneous effects by gender because there is evidence of gender 
differences in the effect of UCT on mental health (Kilburn et al., 2016). We follow Kilburn et 
al. (2016) and provide sub-sample estimates of our models to make them comparable with 
this study. 
 
5.6 Robustness checks 
We carry out a number of robustness checks on attrition effects, on the threshold applied to 
identify poor (R800), on the assumption of sharing the cash grant within the household. We 
also carry out a placebo-treatment receipt estimation to test anticipation effects. These can 
also help in further identifying support for the validity of the instrumental variable. 
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Sample Selection 
Livelihoods of individuals can improve over time, for example due to the cash transfer. As a 
result, they can move out of poverty over the course of the study. This group of individuals is 
included in the full NIDS survey but excluded from the analysis. Considering the assumptions 
of cash support programmes, those individuals close to the monetary eligibility threshold at 
the onset of the survey are likely to fall into this group (and so are the new entries which are 
marginally above the threshold at the onset). Ignoring potential sample selection induced by 
improved income for households receiving cash transfer payment can lead to a downward 
bias in the estimates.  
 
Therefore, we run four sub-analyses using the instrumental variable approach with fixed effect 
estimation to test for sample selection. In the first sub-analysis, we keep only eligible 
individuals from wave one and estimate the model for all years using this reduced sample. 
This can give us an idea if my findings are robust to drop-outs enforced by applying the 
selected threshold. In a second approach, we estimate the model with the full sample, 
including all income groups to test robustness of the cash transfer effects on mental health 
across the full population. Finally, we use the full balanced panel sample irrespective of 
income group and in the fourth model we use the balanced sample of my preferred study 
sample. The third and fourth sub-analyses address concerns regarding attrition as balanced 
panel samples suffer most from selection bias, if a bias is present (Wooldridge, 2001).  
 
Excluding the recipient of the cash transfer 
A core assumption of the study is that cash transfers received by care takers are shared on a 
household level. We test this assumption by re-estimating our models excluding those 
individuals who are cash transfer recipient within the household. We would expect the 
coefficient associated with receiving CSG to be unchanged if cash transfers were shared within 
the household. 
 
Placebo treatment estimation 
Another robustness check addresses the differences in characteristics of households receiving 
and non-receiving the cash transfer. We run a set of placebo-estimations to understand if 
these conditional variations matter and how independent the effect of the cash transfer is for 
mental health. We use a reduced sample size in this analysis composed as follows: at the time 
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of the comparison, in wave 1-3 neither household receives the cash transfer but a sub-set of 
households will receive the transfer in wave 4. We use a dummy variable which identifies 
individuals living in households that will receive the cash transfer at wave 4 but who have not 
received the CSG in any previous wave as “1” and “0” otherwise. We compare never receivers 
with receivers only in the final wave, wave four, but estimate this model using data on the 
balanced sample on the first three waves. We define treated individuals as those who receive 
CSG in any of the waves, while the never-receivers are defined as untreated.   
 
We undertake three estimations, first a pooled cross-sectional analysis over the first three 
waves, second an instrumental variable analysis over the first three waves and finally an 
instrumental variable analysis over all four waves. The instrument is the binary variable 
indicating if the individual lives in a household with a child of CSG eligible age. Non-significance 
of the placebo-dummy in the first and second estimation would imply that the cash transfer 
and the instrumented cash transfer are truly exogenous to household characteristics and 
affects mental health whilst controlling for confounders. Significance in the third estimation 
would further support the causal effect of the cash transfer on mental health outcomes. Non-
significance would also imply that no anticipation effect for the cash transfer programme 
occurs, which would further support the validity of the instrumental variable. 
 
Using non-eligible to test treatment causality 
A last robustness test is directed at the causality of the cash transfer effect on mental health. 
We use a “placebo” sample of individuals living in household that are not-eligible to receive 
the CSG because household income is above the threshold of Rand800 per capita. We use all 
four waves in a fixed effect estimation of mental health on our instrumental binary variable 
“individual lives with a CSG age eligible child” while controlling for covariates. A statistically 
significant effect of the dummy variable on mental health would imply that the age of the child 
indeed affects mental health directly even though households are not eligible to receive CSG. 
No statistically significant effect would support the assumption that CSG affects mental health 
because of the cash transfer and not because of the age of the child. We further use 
descriptive analysis on attrition and sample transition. We present the discussion of the 
analysis in the appendix in section A2.  
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6 Results 
6.1 Pooled versus Fixed Effects 
Table 3 reports the results of the pooled and FE estimation. We find a positive and significant 
effect on mental health for individuals living in a CSG receiving household across the models. 
In the pooled model without covariates in column (1), individuals living in a CSG receiving 
household have on average a 0.325 point higher CES-D score than individuals living in non-
recipient households. 
 
Table 3 here 
 
When adding all covariates to the pooled model in column (2) the coefficient increases to 
0.405. This implies a 2% increase in CES-D score compared to the mean of CES-D. When 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in the models using FE without and with covariates 
in columns (3) and (4), results show that the size of the coefficient increases and it remains 
statistically significant. This indicates a downward bias in the pooled OLS estimate due to 
correlation of the main explanatory variable with unobservable idiosyncratic factors. The 
coefficient size reported in column (4) is 0.536, which indicates a 2.7% increase in CES-D from 
the mean of CES-D.  
 
In both the pooled and FE models, being younger than 19 years old is associated with better 
mental health. In the FE model age has a positive non-linear association with mental health. 
Males have on average a significantly better mental health than females in the pooled model. 
In the pooled model, age has a non-linear, and positive above 30 years, association with 
mental health. In the pooled model, mental health is better in households of larger size. 
Economic decision making and negative events are both negatively associated with mental 
health.  
 
Notably, attrition is significantly and negatively associated with transfer receipt in the pooled 
model in column (2). However, when using FE estimation this association loses statistical 
significance which tells us that FE address the correlation of attrition with unobservable 
factors determining mental health.  
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We perform a Hausman test to determine if FE or Random Effects models should be used. The 
Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis p<0.001 in favour of the FE estimation.  
 
6.2 2SLS and 2SLS FE estimation  
The estimates of the first stage regression of the different instrumental variable models are 
presented in Table 4, for the whole population in columns (1) to (4) including pooled OLS 
without and with covariates and FE estimations without and with covariates, and FE 
estimation for male and female separately in columns (5) and (6). The regression of the 
household level CSG receipt on the instrumental variable in the top row of the table shows 
positive significant effects throughout all specifications. 
 
Table 4 here 
 
The magnitude of the coefficient of the instrumental variable varies over the specifications 
with highest magnitude for the 2SLS estimation without covariates (0.833). Adding covariates 
to the OLS estimation in model (2) reduces the coefficient to 0.723, indicating correlation of 
the instrumental variable with other factors. When using FE with 2SLS estimation without 
covariates, the magnitude is further reduced to 0.712, which indicates that FE account for 
unobservable constant factors. Adding covariates in model (4) to the FE estimation further 
reduces the magnitude of the coefficient to 0.644. The estimated coefficient gives the 
compliance rate for the group of transfer recipients with the instrumental variable. The 
compliance rate shown in model (1) is 83%, which implies that 83% of the recipients comply 
in their treatment status conditional on the instrumental variable.  
Table 5 presents the findings of the second stage of the pooled and FE instrumental variable 
estimations for the same six models. The coefficient associated with the CSG is positive and 
significant in all models, except for the one estimated on the male sub-sample where it is not 
statistically significant (p=0.392).  
 
Table 5 here 
 
In column (1) the effect of living in a receiving CSG household on mental health outcome, 
estimated using pooled 2SLS, increases mental health by about half a unit on the CES-D scale 
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(0.614) compared to individuals living in non-receiving household. The magnitude of the effect 
is higher (0.749) in model (2) when controlling in the pooled 2SLS estimation for confounding 
factors in the determining mental health. The FE 2SLS estimation in column (3) shows a 
marginally larger magnitude compared to the 2SLS with a coefficient of size 0.621 which is a 
15% standard deviation increase in mental health. The marginally larger size of the coefficient 
in column (3) compared to column (1) shows that the 2SLS estimation without covariates in 
(1) is downwardly biased due to unobserved heterogeneous factors.  
 
Adding control variables in the FE 2SLS estimation in column (4) shows a transfer effect of size 
0.822 on individuals’ mental health which is a 4.1% improvement in the mean value of mental 
health. The 2SLS coefficient of transfer receipt without FE shows low variation with and 
without conditioning on covariates whereas in the 2SLS estimation with FE it shows significant 
difference conditioning on covariates and without covariates. An explanation is that covariates 
are correlated with unobservable factors adding bias to the estimation, which we address by 
using individual FE model. The CSG effect is not significant for the male sub-sample in column 
(5) and the strongest cash transfer effect amongst all models is observed in the female sub-
sample in column (6) with an improvement on the CES-D scale of one unit or an increase in 
mental health of five per cent. 
 
The FE 2SLS model with covariates in column (4) is twice the size of the pooled model 
coefficient in column (2) of table 3, indicating a potential downwardly bias of the pooled 
model-coefficient due to unobserved heterogeneity in mental health. The bias remains when 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in health but not instrumenting for the treatment 
receipt as the coefficient size of the FE in column (4) of table 3 is still 0.3 points lower than the 
one estimated with FE 2SLS in column (4) of table 5. 
 
When controlling for determinants of mental health, the following coefficients estimated with 
the pooled 2SLS in column (2) are associated with mental health. We find positive significant 
effects for being under 19 years of age, being male and the size of the household. Significant 
negative associations for age (though with increasing positive non-linear age effects), being in 
charge of economic decision making, death in household and attrition. The attrition dummy is 
only significant in the pooled model. This indicates for the FE models that individuals who 
leave the survey for reasons of death or non-response are not systematically biasing the 
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estimation. 
 
We find in the FE model in column (4), positive significant associations with age. Both FE 
models in columns (4) and (5) show a positive effect of being under 19 years of age on mental 
health. The FE model for males in column (5) shows positive effects of negative events on male 
mental health. In contrast the FE model for females in column (6) identifies negative 
associations of negative events with mental health.  
 
We test the power of our instrumental variable and find strong support for using the 
instrumental variable “individual lives in a household with a CSG-age eligible child”. We 
provide a detailed overview of the test findings in section A2 of the online appendix. 
 
6.3 Robustness checks 
 We present the analysis of sample selection effects in table 6 and attrition in table 7. In table 
8 and table 9, we present the analysis of the cash transfer effect on mental health without the 
care taking recipient(s) in the household and the placebo analysis of instrumented and non-
instrumented cash transfer receipt. Table 10 presents a last supporting test on the exclusion 
assumption of the instrumental variable. 
 
The robustness analysis regarding the sample composition (tables 6 and 7) shows that the 
selection model is robust to changes in the margin and to transition in income, as the 
coefficient associated with being a CSG recipient remains statistically significant and of similar 
magnitudes in all models. When estimating the IV model on the balanced panel, the results 
are qualitatively unaffected, indicating again that attrition due to death or non-response does 
not bias our sample estimation.  
 
Table 8 presents the results from the first stage of the 2SLS estimation on the sample excluding 
the individual in CSG-recipient households in columns (1), of the placebo-sample test over the 
first three waves in column (2) and of the placebo sample with all four waves in column (3). 
The instrumental variable is valid for the reduced sample in column (1) and not significant in 
column (2). This indicates that the instrumental variable is tracking changes and variations in 
CSG recipients correctly, as none of the individuals receive the CSG over the first three waves. 
Using the placebo sample on all four waves, the instrumental variable is significant as 
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expected. 
 
In table 9, estimates of the second stage of the sample excluding the care taking individuals 
receiving the CSG-recipient(s) in model (1) show a significant strong effect of the instrumental 
variable on mental health (1.220). This finding supports the argument that the cash transfer is 
shared within the household among the household members and not only kept and used by 
the actual recipient(s). In model (2), which shows the results of the first three waves pooled 
cross-sectional OLS regression on the actual binary “last wave CSG”, no significant effect is 
associated with being future CSG recipients and mental health. No significant effect is 
observed in model (3), using the instrumental variable approach over the first three waves. In 
model (4), we find a strong significant positive effect (6.5) of the cash transfer on mental 
health when the placebo-recipients actually receive the cash transfer in the final round 
compared to the never-recipients. These findings support the causality of the cash transfer 
effect on mental health and the validity of the instrumental variable against possible 
anticipation effects. 
 
Table 10 presents the estimation of the effect of mental health on child CSG age eligibility, 
using the all waves with individuals living in financially non-eligible households. The binary 
instrumental variable indicating if an individual lives with a CSG age eligible child has no 
significant effect on mental health. This further supports our claim of no effects of child age 
eligibility on adult mental health and overall the exclusion assumption of the chosen 
instrumental variable. 
 
Our robustness analysis shows that our results are robust to sample selection and attrition 
effects, that mental health effects remain strong when actual cash transfer recipients are 
excluded from the sample estimation, and that no placebo-effects of cash transfer receipt 
occur. We also find further strong support for the exclusion assumption (e.g. valididty) of the 
instrumental variable to hold as living with a child in the CSG age-eligibility bracket in non-
poor households has no statistical significant effect on mental health. We further show using 
a descriptive analysis that transition and attrition effects do not bias the sample composition, 
see appendix section A2 for a discussion of these results.  
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7 Discussion and conclusion 
This is the first study to analyse the effect of a large unconditional cash transfer programme, 
the South African Child Support Grant, on mental health of adults, rather than specific 
population sub-groups, living in poverty. We use a large longitudinal sample of 10,925 
individuals from four waves (2008-2014) of the National Income Dynamics Study, a 
representative survey of the South African population. Using a Fixed Effect instrumental 
variable approach to account for potential selection bias into the CSG, we find that the cash 
transfer has a strong positive effect on mental health of individuals living in recipient 
households on average by half a unit on a 30-point scale. We conducted sub-analyses by 
gender and found a significant effect, only for females, twice the size of the male coefficient. 
We find our results robust to potential attrition, sample selection and placebo-effects. 
 
The finding of positive effects of an unconditional cash transfer on mental health fits into the 
behavioural economics and psycho-social literature on the relationship between poverty and 
mental health conditions (Lund, 2012). It is also in line with findings from studies analysing the 
short term effects of unconditional cash transfer programmes on mental health on sub-
populations from LMICs (Plagerson et al., 2011; Baird et al., 2013; Eyal and Burns, 2015; 
Haushofer and Shapiro, 2016). 
 
Previous work on the effect of a UCT effect on adolescent mental health found different 
disparities with significant effects only for males (Kilburn et al., 2016). The difference in 
findings can be explained by the different design of the cash transfer programmes. Kilburn et 
al. (2016) used a UCT with a short term horizon whereas the CSG is a long term support 
programme. Differences can also occur due to the different sample populations. Kilburn et al. 
(2016) used a sample of adolescents whereas our analysis contributed by using an adult 
sample. Our findings of significant effects fit into the epidemiological literature on the burden 
of mental health among the females. Female mental health is possibly more responsive to the 
UCT as women are at higher risk for common mental health disorders with 50% higher 
prevalence of depression for women (World Health Organization, 2008).  
 
The main challenge of this paper is that the programme is not randomly assigned. Our 
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instrumental variable approach with Fixed Effects accounts for selection effects. The 
advantage of using a natural experiment like the CSG is the external validity of its implication 
for studying the mental health effects of cash transfer programmes. Our chosen instrumental 
variable, “household contains an eligible child”, is strong and valid in explaining cash transfer 
receipt. This instrumental variable varies exogenously over time because of the changes to the 
eligibility threshold making it stronger than a simple cross-section with a single eligibility 
criterion. Furthermore, we conducted several tests to support the validity and exclusion 
assumption of the instrumental variable. 
 
The aim of this study was to understand the effects of an UCT on mental health of the average 
poor adult population. Due to the design of the CSG, which requires a household to have an 
age-eligible child to receive the cash transfer, results may be representative of households 
with an eligible children, rather than a South African household. However, this is an unlikely 
concern for the composition of poor households in South Africa. In the average poor South 
African household live between three and four children, where children are defined as 
household members below age 18 (Statistics South Africa, 2017). 
 
The finding highlights that unconditional cash transfer programmes have strong and robust 
direct positive benefits for mental health of adult populations from LMICs. Following the 
Grossman model of health where more healthy time is an input factor of individual 
productivity (Grossman, 1972), better mental health can enable individuals to improve their 
productivity which can then contribute to decrease poverty in the long-term. The effects of 
better mental health could possibly show strong spill-over effects on other dimensions, 
especially when considering the strong co-morbidities of mental with physical health and the 
strong relationship of mental health with poverty (Lund et al., 2010; Ohrnberger et al., 2017). 
In the South African context, population wide improvements in mental health could show 
significant effects on HIV-prevalence, due to the strong positive correlation between the two 
(Lund et al., 2012).  
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Tables 
Table 1 Child Support Grant age and income eligibility criteria and grant value between 
1998 and 2014 
Legislation date Eligible age (years) Income threshold (South 
African Rand per month) 
Grant amount (South 
African Rand per 
month) 
01/10/1998 0-7  
 
R 800 in Rural Areas; 
R 1,100 in Urban Areas 
 
 
Unchanged until October 
2008 
R 100 
01/07/1999 0-7 R 100 
01/07/2000 0-7 R 100 
01/07/2001 0-7 R 110 
01/04/2002 0-7 R 140 
01/10/2002 0-7 R 160 
01/04/2003 0-9 R 160 
01/04/2004 0-11 R 170 
01/04/2005 0-14 R 180 
01/04/2006 0-14 R 190 
01/04/2007 0-14 R 200 
01/04/2008 0-14 R 210 
01/10/2008 0-14 R 2,300 R 230 
01/01/2009 0-15 R 2,400 R 240 
01/04/2010 0-16 R 2,500 R 250 
01/04/2011 0-17 R 2,600 R 260 
01/01/2012 0-18 R 2,800 R 280 
01/04/2013 0-18 R 2,900 R 290 
01/04/2014 0-18 R 3,100 R 310 
01/10/2014 0-18 R 3,200 R 320 
 Source: (Eyal and Burns, 2015): Notes: A.) Age refers to the upper age limit. B.) The income threshold 
for CSG eligibility was defined as 10 times the grant amount in October 2008 to adjust for constantly 
increasing price-inflation. C.) If the primary caregiver is married, the income threshold is doubled, for 
instance to R 6,400 per month in October 2014.  
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Table 2a Summary statistics 2008-2014 
Variables Definition
  
2008 
n=6,801 
2010 
n=7,831 
2012     
n=7,818 
2014 
n=6,323 
All years 
n=10,925 
Outcome Variable 
CES-D Centre for Epidemiological 
Depression Scale ranging from 0-30; 
higher values indicate better mental 
health 
18.99 
(4.39) 
20.07 
(4.00) 
20.12 
(4.28) 
20.36 
(4.04) 
19.90 
(4.21) 
Main Explanatory Variable 
Household CSG 1 if individual lives in a CSG- receiving 
household, 0 otherwise 
0.65 0.76 0.80 0.83 0.76 
Instrumental variable 
Household  
with CSG eligible 
child 
1 if a child eligible for the CSG lives in 
the household, 0 otherwise (including 
no children) 
0.83 0.87 0.90 0.89 0.87 
Covariates 
Male  0 if female, 1 if male 0.32 0.34 0.32 0.29 0.32 
Age The age of the individual in years  37.58 
(17.64) 
37.86 
(18.18) 
38.61 
(18.00) 
40.96 
(17.69) 
38.68 
(17.94) 
Age under 19 1 if the individual is <19 years of age, 
0 otherwise 
0.17 0.16 0.13 0.05 0.13 
Econ. decision  
maker  
1 if the individual is the economic 
decision maker of the household, 0 
otherwise 
0.39 0.39 0.41 0.46 0.41 
Size of the 
household 
The number of household members 5.91  
(3.17) 
6.62 
(3.82) 
6.60 
 (3.79) 
6.55 
(3.53) 
6.43 
(3.61) 
 
Death in household 1 if a household member has died in 
the past two years, 0 otherwise 
0.18 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.15 
Household OAG 1 if individual lives in an Old Age 
Pension -receiving household, 0 
otherwise 
0.32 0.41 0.39 0.41 0.38 
Household  
DG  
1 if individual lives in a DG-receiving 
household, 0 otherwise 
0.15 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12 
Household FCG 1 if individual lives in a FCG-receiving 
household, 0 otherwise 
0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 
Household CDG 1 if individual lives in a CDG-receiving 
household, 0 otherwise 
0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Neighbourhood 
Theft 
0”never happens in neighbourhood”, 
1”very rare in neighbourhood”, 2”not 
common in neighbourhood”, 3”fairly 
common in neighbourhood”, 4” very 
common in neighbourhood” 
1.88  
(1.49) 
1.84 
(1.38) 
2.26  
(1.43) 
2.21 
(1.48) 
2.05 
(1.45) 
Note: Descriptive statistics are on the sample of the estimated models. n indicates the number of 
individuals. Variable means (standard deviations when applicable).   
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Table 2b Summary statistics 2008-2014 
Variables Definition
  
2008 
n=6,801 
2010 
n=7,831 
2012     
n=7,818 
2014 
n=6,323 
All years 
n=10,925 
Region  The base category is “Rural formal”  
Tribal 
Authority Area 
1 if the individual lives in a tribal 
authority area, 0 otherwise 
 
0.53 0.54 0.56 0.55 0.54 
 
   Urban Formal 1 if the individual lives in an urban 
formal area, 0 otherwise 
 
0.31 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.30 
   Urban Informal  
(Townships) 
1 if the individual lives in an urban 
informal area, 0 otherwise 
0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Province The base category is “Limpopo”  
Western Cape 1 if the individual lives in Western 
Cape, 0 otherwise 
0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 
Eastern Cape 1 if the individual lives in Eastern 
Cape, 0 otherwise 
0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Northern Cape 1 if the individual lives in Northern 
Cape, 0 otherwise 
0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 
Free State  1 if the individual lives in Free State, 
0 otherwise 
0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 
KwaZulu-West 1 if the individual lives in KwaZulu-
West, 0 otherwise 
0.33 0.34 0.35 0.38 0.35 
North West 1 if the individual lives in North 
West, 0 otherwise 
0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07 
Gauteng 1 if the individual lives in Gauteng, 0 
otherwise 
0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 
Mpumalanga 1 if the individual lives in 
Mpumalanga, 0 otherwise 
0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Note: Descriptive statistics are on the sample of the estimated models. n indicates the number of 
individuals. Variable means (standard deviations when applicable).   
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Table 3 Effect of CSG on mental health: Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect estimation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Pooled OLS 
 without 
covariates 
Pooled OLS 
 with 
covariates 
FE  
without 
covariates 
FE  
with 
covariates 
          
Household CSG 0.325*** 0.405*** 0.449*** 0.536*** 
 (0.087) (0.091) (0.119) (0.126) 
Male  0.346***   
  (0.051)   
Age  -0.076***  0.136* 
  (0.009)  (0.080) 
Age Squared  0.001***  0.001 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age under 19  0.513***  0.385** 
  (0.097)  (0.169) 
Economic decision maker  -0.143**  0.037 
  (0.061)  (0.082) 
Household Size  0.048**  0.045 
  (0.022)  (0.038) 
Negative Event  -0.215**  -0.048 
  (0.094)  (0.116) 
Neighbourhood Theft  -0.036  0.034 
  (0.030)  (0.035) 
Attrition  -0.194**  0.014 
  (0.098)  (0.132) 
Constant 18.778*** 21.323*** 18.759*** 12.149*** 
 (0.122) (0.324) (0.131) (3.031) 
     
Year YES YES YES YES 
Other Government Programmes No YES No YES 
Child Age Dummy No YES No YES 
Province No YES No YES 
Region  No YES No YES 
Observations 28,773 28,773 28,773 28,773 
Individuals    10,925 10,925 
R-squared 0.016 0.066 0.020 0.025 
The outcome variable is CES-D (0-30) the measure for depression; PSU clustered standard errors are 
in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 4 Effect of eligibility on CSG receipt: First Stage 2SLS, Fixed effect 2SLS estimation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
First Stage 
2SLS 
without 
covariates 
First Stage 
2SLS with 
covariates 
 
First Stage 
FE without 
covariates 
 
First Stage 
FE with 
covariates 
First Stage 
FE Male 
First Stage 
FE Female 
              
CSG eligible child 0.833*** 0.723*** 0.712*** 0.644*** 0.636*** 0.643*** 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.014) (0.016) (0.022) (0.017) 
Male  -0.021***     
  (0.004)     
Age  0.001  0.011** 0.002 0.014** 
  (0.001)  (0.005) (0.011) (0.006) 
Age Squared  -0.000**  -0.000* 0.000 -0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age under 19  -0.007  0.012 -0.003 0.017 
  (0.007)  (0.011) (0.018) (0.014) 
Economic decision maker  0.003  -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 
  (0.005)  (0.005) (0.012) (0.007) 
Household Size  -0.001  0.010*** 0.014*** 0.008*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Negative Event  -0.010  0.005 0.002 0.007 
  (0.008)  (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) 
Neighbourhood Theft  0.003  -0.001 -0.002 0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Attrition  -0.010  -0.005 0.013 -0.014 
  (0.008)  (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) 
Constant -0.038*** -0.040     
 (0.007) (0.026)     
       
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Other Government Support NO YES NO YES YES YES 
Child Age Dummy NO YES NO YES YES YES 
Province NO YES NO YES YES YES 
Region  NO YES NO YES YES YES 
Observations 28,773 28,773 28,773 28,773 9,147 19,626 
Individuals   10,925 10,925 3,723 7,202 
R-squared 0.443 0.482 0.277 0.305 0.349 0.286 
The outcome variable is a binary variable indicating if the individual lives in a CSG-receiving 
household or not; PSU clustered standard errors are in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 5 Effect of CSG on mental health: Second Stage 2SLS, Fixed Effect 2SLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
2SLS 
without 
covariates 
2SLS with 
covariates 
FE 2SLS 
without 
covariates. 
FE 2SLS 
with 
covariates 
FE 2SLS 
Male 
FE 2SLS 
Female 
              
Household CSG 0.614*** 0.749*** 0.621*** 0.822*** 0.468 1.000*** 
 (0.125) (0.152) (0.231) (0.279) (0.447) (0.323) 
Male  0.368***     
  (0.051)     
Age  -0.077***  0.133* 0.087 0.146 
  (0.009)  (0.080) (0.146) (0.092) 
Age Squared  0.001***  0.001* -0.001 0.001** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Age under 19  0.517***  0.380** 0.734** 0.143 
  (0.098)  (0.169) (0.288) (0.214) 
Economic decision maker  -0.135**  0.041 -0.073 0.028 
  (0.061)  (0.082) (0.156) (0.110) 
Household Size  0.053**  0.042 0.014 0.057 
  (0.022)  (0.037) (0.067) (0.039) 
Negative Event  -0.208**  -0.050 0.386** -0.215* 
  (0.094)  (0.115) (0.161) (0.129) 
Neighbourhood Theft  -0.036  0.034 0.043 0.032 
  (0.030)  (0.035) (0.047) (0.038) 
Attrition  -0.187*  0.015 -0.117 0.088 
  (0.098)  (0.132) (0.194) (0.152) 
Constant 18.588*** 21.169***     
 (0.128) (0.326)     
       
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Other Government Support NO YES NO YES YES YES 
Child Age Dummy NO YES NO YES YES YES 
Province NO YES NO YES YES YES 
Region  NO YES NO YES YES YES 
Observations 28,773 28,773 28,773 28,773 9,147 19,626 
Individuals   10,925 10,925 3,723 7,202 
R-squared 0.015 0.065 0.019 0.025 0.026 0.029 
The outcome variable is CES-D (0-30) the measure for depression; PSU clustered standard errors 
are in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 6 Robustness tests: Sample estimations: First stage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
Study Sample Baseline Full Sample Full Balanced Study Balanced 
CSG eligible child 0.644*** 0.596*** 0.544*** 0.546*** 0.636*** 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.018) 
Age 0.011** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.014** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
Age Squared -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age under 19 0.012 0.031*** 0.014 0.015 0.011 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.015) (0.018) 
Economic dec. maker -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) 
Household Size 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Negative Event 0.005 0.002 0.010 0.006 0.006 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) 
Neighbourhood Theft -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Attrition -0.005 0.002 -0.003   
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.006)   
Year YES YES YES YES YES 
Other Gov. Support YES YES YES YES YES 
Child Age Dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
Province YES YES YES YES YES 
Region  YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 28,773 29,614 48,872 26,553 16,573 
Individuals 10,925 9,567 17,164 7,717 5,540 
R-squared 0.305 0.345 0.326 0.322 0.303 
The outcome variable is the binary indicating if the individual lives in a household that received the CSG or 
not; (1) is the sample applied throughout this study, with restricting the sample to per capita income <=R800, 
(2) is the using individuals recorded in the baseline according to the selection in (1) throughout the waves, (3) 
is the full NIDS sample, (4) is the full balanced NIDS sample, (5) is the balanced sample (1). We control for the 
full set of covariates and where indicated for year, other government support programmes, child age, 
province and region effects; PSU clustered standard errors are in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 7 Robustness tests: Sample estimations: Second stage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
Study Sample Baseline Full Sample Full Balanced Study Balanced 
            
Household CSG 0.822*** 0.673*** 0.502** 0.861*** 1.147*** 
 (0.279) (0.234) (0.214) (0.255) (0.300) 
Age 0.133* -0.001 0.083 0.003 0.002 
 (0.080) (0.077) (0.070) (0.079) (0.098) 
Age Squared 0.001* 0.001** 0.000 0.001* 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age under 19 0.380** 0.681*** 0.464*** 0.691*** 0.445* 
 (0.169) (0.173) (0.135) (0.199) (0.234) 
Economic dec. 0.041 0.103 0.000 -0.005 0.033 
 (0.082) (0.075) (0.059) (0.074) (0.097) 
Household Size 0.042 0.056* 0.054* 0.059* 0.066* 
 (0.037) (0.032) (0.030) (0.032) (0.036) 
Negative Event -0.050 -0.213* -0.189* -0.349*** -0.277** 
 (0.115) (0.109) (0.099) (0.112) (0.123) 
Neighbour. Theft 0.034 -0.005 0.021 0.001 0.006 
 (0.035) (0.031) (0.027) (0.031) (0.041) 
Attrition 0.015 -0.118 -0.100   
 (0.132) (0.128) (0.098)   
      
Year YES YES YES YES YES 
Other Gov. Support YES YES YES YES YES 
Child Age Dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
Province YES YES YES YES YES 
Region  YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 28,773 29,614 48,872 26,553 16,573 
Individuals  10,925 9,567 17,164 7,717 5,540 
R-squared 0.025 0.021 0.015 0.019 0.028 
The outcome variable is CES-D (0-30) the measure for depression;(1) is the sample applied throughout this 
study, with restricting the sample to per capita income <=R800, (2) is the using individuals recorded in the 
baseline according to the selection in (1) throughout the waves, (3) is the full NIDS sample, (4) is the full 
balanced NIDS sample, (5) is the balanced sample (1). We control for the full set of covariates and where 
indicated for year, other government support programmes, child age, province and region effects; PSU 
clustered standard errors are in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 8 Robustness test: Sample estimations: Placebo tests and non-recipient test first 
stage 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  First Stage:  
HH without  
immediate CSG Recipient 
First Stage: 
Placebo test  
wave 1-3 
First Stage: 
 Placebo test  
all waves 
CSG eligible child 0.534*** 0.045 0.135*** 
 (0.019) (0.065) (0.023) 
Male  -0.088*** 0.007 
  (0.030) (0.009) 
Age -0.005 -0.008 0.002 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.002) 
Age Squared 0.000** 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age under 19 0.037** -0.057 -0.001 
 (0.015) (0.052) (0.017) 
Economic decision maker -0.021** 0.011 -0.009 
 (0.009) (0.026) (0.009) 
Household Size 0.025*** 0.057*** 0.013*** 
 (0.005) (0.015) (0.005) 
Negative Event 0.004 -0.013 0.019 
 (0.012) (0.032) (0.013) 
Neighbourhood Theft -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) 
Attrition -0.008   
 (0.011)   
Constant  0.515*** -0.078 
  (0.167) (0.053) 
    
Year YES YES YES 
Other Government Support YES YES YES 
Child Age Dummy YES YES YES 
Province YES YES YES 
Region  YES YES YES 
Observations 16,332 1,749 2,122 
Individuals 6,808   
R-squared 0.315 0.144 0.486 
The outcome variable in (1) is  the variable indicating if the individual lives in a CSG-receiving household", in 
(2)and (3)  is the binary variable indicating if the individual lives in a household which receives the CSG only in 
the last wave; Model (1) is the first stage instrumental variable estimation of the study sample without the 
receiving care taker of the grant in the household, (2) is the pooled cross-sectional instrumental variable first 
stage estimation of the placebo test comparing individuals living in never-receiving households with individuals 
that live in a household which receives the CSG only in the last wave, a balanced panel over the first three 
waves is used for the estimation, (3) is taking all four waves for the instrumental variable pooled-cross sectional 
analysis into account but the comparison remains. We control for the full set of covariates and where indicated 
for year, other government support programmes, child age, province and region effects; PSU clustered 
standard errors are in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9 Robustness test: Sample estimations: Placebo tests and non-recipient test 
including second stage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
FE 2SLS: 
 without immediate CSG 
Recipient 
Placebo test 
wave 1-3 
2SLS: 
 Placebo test 
wave 1-3 
2SLS: 
 Placebo test all 
waves 
Last Wave CSG  0.104 22.370  
  (0.266) (31.447)  
Household CSG 1.220***   7.016*** 
 (0.388)   (2.485) 
Male  0.482** 2.480 0.620*** 
  (0.196) (2.877) (0.195) 
Age 0.025 -0.082** 0.086 -0.086*** 
 (0.109) (0.034) (0.270) (0.034) 
Age Squared 0.001 0.001** -0.001 0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Age under 19 0.256 0.406 1.736 0.642 
 (0.220) (0.535) (2.307) (0.525) 
Economic decision maker 0.044 -0.455** -0.698 -0.322 
 (0.122) (0.230) (0.700) (0.206) 
Household Size -0.041 0.035 -1.246 -0.002 
 (0.051) (0.097) (1.868) (0.103) 
Negative Event 0.089 -0.241 0.043 -0.507* 
 (0.139) (0.304) (0.931) (0.294) 
Neighbourhood Theft 0.055 -0.131 -0.080 -0.098 
 (0.041) (0.080) (0.254) (0.078) 
Attrition 0.142    
 (0.156)    
Constant  22.142*** 10.621 22.136*** 
  (1.002) (16.709) (1.029) 
Year YES YES YES YES 
Other Government Support YES YES YES YES 
Child Age Dummy YES YES YES YES 
Province YES YES YES YES 
Region  YES YES YES YES 
Observations 16,332 1,749 1,749 2,122 
Individuals 6,808    
R-squared 0.019 0.108 -4.248 0.025 
The outcome variable is CES-D (0-30) the measure for depression; (1) is the instrumental variable estimation of 
the study sample without the receiving care taker of the grant in the household, (2) is the pooled cross-
sectional estimation of the placebo test comparing individuals living in never-receiving households with 
individuals that live in a household which receives the CSG only in the last wave, a balanced panel over the first 
three waves is used for the estimation, (3) is the same as in (2) but using the cross-sectional pooled 
instrumental variable “eligible child for CSG in household” for the placebo test, (4) is taking all four waves for 
the instrumental variable pooled-cross sectional analysis into account but the comparison remains. We control 
for the full set of covariates and where indicated for year, other government support programmes, child age, 
province and region effects; PSU clustered standard errors are in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 10 Fixed effect estimation of CES-D on child eligibility with individuals living in 
financially non-eligible households 
  (1) 
 
FE  
with covariates 
    
CSG eligible child 0.204 
 (0.257) 
Age 0.093 
 (0.152) 
Age Squared -0.000 
 (0.001) 
Age under 19 0.787** 
 (0.334) 
Economic decision maker -0.021 
 (0.125) 
Household Size 0.011 
 (0.084) 
Negative Event -0.502* 
 (0.274) 
Neighbourhood Theft 0.043 
 (0.044) 
Attrition -0.243 
 (0.178) 
Constant 17.371*** 
 (5.160) 
  
Year YES 
Other Government Support YES 
Child Age Dummy YES 
Province YES 
Region  YES 
Observations 21,720 
Individuals 13,982 
R-squared 0.016 
The outcome variable is CES-D (0-30) the measure for depression. 
We control for the full set of covariates; PSU clustered standard 
errors are in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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APPENDIX: The effect of cash transfers on mental health – New Evidence from South Africa 
 We present in section A1 the descriptive analysis of individuals living in cash transfer 
receiving households with individuals living in cash transfer non-receiving households and in 
A2 a descriptive analysis on sample attrition and transition. 
 
A1 Comparison of individuals by CSG status 
Table A1 compares individuals living in recipient and non-recipient households. 
Individuals living in CSG recipient households have on average a slightly higher mean CES-D 
score (19.8 vs. 19.4) than individuals living in non-recipient households. About 42% of 
individuals from a non-recipient household live with a CSG eligible child, whereas 99.4% of 
individuals from a CSG receiving household live with a CSG eligible child. The composition of 
households varies by CSG status. In non-recipient households, 40% are male (24% in a 
receiving household), with average age of about 42 years (39 years in a receiving household). 
57% of individuals in CSG-non-recipient household are involved in economic decision making 
compared to 49% in CSG-receiving households. The average size of recipient households is 
much larger (6 versus 3.5 individuals). The negative shock of a death in the household occurred 
to about 13% of individuals from non-recipient households compared to about 14% from 
receiving households. We observe a fairly similar share of participation in the other social 
grant programmes between CSG recipient and non-recipient households. 
 
A2 Attrition and transition 
 Table A2 describes attrition and transition between the waves. Transition is defined 
here as moving in or out of the sample study due to increase or reduction in income and falling 
below or stepping above the R800 income threshold. Between 2008 and 2010, 1,135 of 6,801 
individuals moved above the income threshold with 593 individuals moving below the 
threshold. Transition increases in both directions over the years involving 2,355 of 7,818 
individuals moving above the threshold between 2012 and 2014 and 1,011 moving below the 
threshold. Attrition is defined here as temporarily or permanently leaving the survey between 
the waves. 4,215 individuals left the study between 2008 and 2010, 4,715 between 2010 and 
2012 and 2,678 between 2012 and 2014. Attrition amongst poor individuals amounts to 2,769 
individuals between 2008 and 2010, 3,271 between 2010 and 2012, and 2,678 from 2012 to 
2014. 
 Mental health outcomes are similar for individuals moving out of the lower income 
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bracket and individuals moving into the lower income bracket (19.69 vs. 19.65 over 2008-
2010, 20.42 vs. 20.17 over 2010-2012, 20.63 vs. 20.88 over 2012-2014. The average CES-D 
amongst the individuals leaving the survey between the waves is fairly similar to the average 
of the survey samples for the waves. Individuals leaving between 2008 and 2010 had a mean 
CES-D score of 19.44 vs. 18.99 for the study sample in 2008, individuals leaving between 2010 
and 2012 had a mean CES-D score of 20.319 vs. 20.07 of observations in 2010 (table A3), and 
20.633 versus 20.12 in 2012 (table A3). The mean scores of CES-D amongst low-income 
individuals leaving the survey between waves are fairly similar to the sample by each wave. 
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APPENDIX: Tables 
Table A6  
Summary statistics comparison of individuals in household receiving and non-receiving 
CSG 
 
CSG Non-Receiving 
Household 
(n=3,855) 
CSG-Receiving 
Household 
(n=9,682) 
t-test of 
difference 
CES-D 19.373 (4.042) 19.887 (3.705) -7.099 
Household with CSG eligible child 0.426 0.994 -109.816 
Male 0.393 0.236 26.160 
Age (years) 41.867 (14.749) 39.125 (12.273) 11.055 
Age under 19 0.090 0.105 -3.950 
Economic decision maker  0.569 0.490 11.413 
Size of the household 3.513 (2.013) 6.084 (2.897) -50.485 
Death in household 0.130 0.144 -2.027 
Household Old Age Pension 0.307 0.331 -2.756 
Household DG  0.097 0.107 -1.745 
Household FCG 0.048 0.043 1.215 
Household CDG 0.014 0.012 1.127 
Neighbourhood Theft 2.035 (1.457) 2.066 (1.454) -1.111 
Region 1.44 (0.795) 1.337 (0.734) 7.572 
Attrition 0.114 0.090 5.136 
Note: Descriptive statistics are on the sample of the estimated models over all years. n indicates 
the number of households. Variable means (standard deviations). T-test are testing for Ho: diff = 0 
in mean. 
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Table A7  
Number of compliers, always takers, never takers of the CSG on the household level by 
NIDS waves 
 2008 2010 2012 2014 
Compliers 5,546 6,828 6,943 4,913 
Always takers 0 41 24 22 
Never takers 1,189 918 748 340 
Share of Always takers with 
compliers 
0.000 0.006 0.003 0.005 
Share of Never takers with 
compliers 
0.214 0.134 0.107 0.069 
*Defiers are ruled out by the monotonicity assumption of the LATE saying that individuals have a 
clear preference over their choice to participate in the grant scheme. 
 
Table A3 Summary statistics transition and attrition between NIDS waves 
 2008-2010 2010-2012 2012-2014 
𝑡 + 1 > 𝑅800 ≥ 𝑡 1,135 1,710 2,355 
𝑡 + 1 ≤ 𝑅800 < 𝑡 593 604 1,011 
Attrition 4,215 4,715 4,197 
Attrition 𝑅 ≤ 800 2,769 3,271 2,678 
CES-D  
𝑡 + 1 > 𝑅800 ≥ 𝑡 
19.692 (0.138) 20.423 (0.102) 20.634 (0.090) 
CES  
𝑡 + 1 ≤ 𝑅800 < 𝑡 
19.657 (0.196) 20.178 (0.181) 20.889 (0.141) 
CES-D                Attrition 19.44 (0.071) 20.319 (0.060) 20.633 (0.072) 
CES Attrition 𝑅 ≤ 800 18.902 (0.085) 20.115 (0.072) 20.428 (0.086) 
Mean values reported for CES-D. Standard deviations in parenthesis.  
 
 
